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  This paper, written for a Columbia Law School - American Bar Association 
conference, analyzes  the massive merger wave that has led to substantially 
increased concentration of banking activity in the United States.  One consequence 
is the rise of banks "too big to fail."  The structural changes have also been 
associated with a striking increase in financial institutions' share of all U.S. corporate 
profits along with employee compensation out of line with norms for individuals of 
comparable ability.  Data on concentration in well-defined banking markets are 
quite scarce, but fragmentary evidence suggests appreciable monopoly pricing 
power potential in some product markets.  Mergers that lead to concentration have 
for decades been the focus of antitrust activity.  But a review of the record shows an 
emphasis on mergers that raise local banking market concentration and nearly total 
neglect of other important lines, on which data are lacking.  If antitrust actions were 
to be taken against the concentration of power in those lines, offsetting advantages 
in the form of realized scale economies would have to be weighed.  A review of the 
most recent evidence suggests that difficult tradeoffs might be confronted. FINANCIAL MERGERS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
F. M. Scherer
Harvard University
May 2012
The  past  quarter  century  has  witnessed  among  other  things  a  radical
transformation in the structure of the U.S. banking industry, attributable largely to a
wave of mergers, and the most severe, long-lasting recession experienced by the
United States since the 1930s.  It would be reckless to claim that the two are closely
linked causally.  The recession that began in late 2007 resulted from a perfect storm
combining financial industry innovation, greed, and deception; imprudence on the part
of beleaguered consumers; the legacy of prior crises leaving traditional institutions for
home financing decimated; a securities rating triopoly whose reward structure favored
optimism  over truth-telling; abject regulatory failure; a beneficent but misguided
Congressional policy fostering more widespread home ownership; and dangerously
expansive monetary policy pursued by the U.S. Federal Reserve.
This paper focuses on the changes that emerged in financial industry structure,
conceding at the outset that they were only one component of a larger problem.  Simple
causal chains are even more difficult to establish.  The most direct causal link was
backward from crisis to government bailout, since the leading banking firms became
so large relative to the U.S. financial infrastructure and so systemically interdependent,
in part due to cross-trading of risks, that individual actors' imminent failure threatened
even more grave macroeconomic repercussions.  
Other more subtle links will be suggested, but we begin by examining the
structural changes that occurred and then ask how those structural changes may have
affected the conduct and performance of banking institutions.
The Merger Waves
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the number of FDIC-insured banks in the
United States was roughly stable in the range of 13,500 to 14,500 corporate entities.   
1
Bank failures and mergers reduced those numbers to less than half -- i.e., 6,544 -- by the
year 2010.   Drawing upon Federal Reserve Board data, Stephen Pilloff estimates that
2
between 1990 and 2005, there were nearly 3,800 bank mergers involving $3.6 trillion
of assets.   Using FDIC data, Figure 1 tracks trends in two kinds of FDIC-insured
3
commercial bank disappearances through merger -- voluntary mergers and mergers
orchestrated by federal banking authorities to reallocate (i.e., "resolve") the assets and
liabilities of failing institutions.  Voluntary disappearances through merger peaked in
1988 and again in the mid-1990s, when the U.S. economy was enjoying strong economic
         1.   Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statistics on
Banking: 1934-1994 (Washington: 1995); and Historical Statistics on
Banking, Table CB02, www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBRpt.asp.
     2.  The number of specialized savings and loan banks declined
from 4,613 in 1975 to 1,305 in 2005.
     3.  "The Banking Industry," in James Brock, ed., The Structure
of American Industry (12th edition: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2008),
p. 269.growth.  Resolution mergers peaked in 1988 following unusually high interest rates and
then deregulation, declining to negligible numbers in the 1990s, and then soared
following the crash of 2008.
The Largest Companies
These aggregate numbers fail to capture what was happening at the top of the
banking industry.  That history is encapsulated in Figure 2, tracking mergers effected
by or leading to the six largest banking corporations (measured in terms of assets) as
of the end of 2008.   Altogether, 53 substantial components are found to have come
4
together into the six surviving entities.  The 1985 asset ranks of the merging entities are
given in parentheses following the company names.  Not all of the named survivors
were the first movers in mergers that led to substantial consolidation.  In four cases
marked (circle L), another bank took the lead, choosing after acquisition to adopt a new
name derived from its acquisition target, e.g., when Nationsbank was the instigator of
a merger with Bank of America in 1998.  Legibility limitations allow the chart to track
only the most significant mergers.  At the end of each surviving institution trajectory is
a  numeral  followed  by  "SM,"  for  small  mergers.    The  count,  based  mainly  upon
published company histories in Moody's (now Mergent's) Bank & Finance Manual, is
probably incomplete, but altogether, 139 institutions too small to be encompassed in
Figure 2 were tabulated.  Or in total, the six largest survivors of 2008, with end-of-2010
assets totalling $9.3 trillion, or 66 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, stemmed in
their recent history from 193 merged entities.
Rising Concentration
Merger  activity  was  a  primary  contributor  to  rising  levels  of  aggregate
concentration in the U.S. banking industry.  Figure 3 tracks the share of total U.S. bank-
like assets reported by ten of the largest U.S. banks, commercial and investment, by
year between 1985 and 2010.   Between 1985 and 2010, the share of assets commanded
5
by the top ten increased by 2.5 to 2.9 times, depending upon difficult inclusion and
exclusion choices, to somewhere between 46 and 53 percent in 2010.  Insurance
companies were systematically excluded.  In all years, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
were excluded from the sample because of their unique relationship to the public
purse, confirmed when both were explicitly nationalized at great cost in 2008.  Their
inclusion would have imparted an even steeper upward trend to the concentration data. 
          4.    The  chart  originally  appeared  in  F.  M.  Scherer,  "A
Perplexed Economist Confronts Too Big To Fail,"  European Journal
of Comparative Economics (web http://eaces.liuc.it), vol. 7, no. 2
(2010), pp. 267-284.
     5.  The trajectory shown is quite similar to one presented by
Henry Kaufman in The Road to Financial Reformation (Wiley: 2009),
p. 100.  Kaufman tracks the share of "U.S. financial assets" held
by the largest ten "financial institutions" between 1945 and 2003. 
Unfortunately, he does not disclose exactly the universes and sub-
universes covered or explain how he maintained continuity despite
inconsistent sources.  His chart shows the top ten controlling 20
percent of universe assets in 1945, with a decline to 10 percent in
1990 and then a sharp increase to 48 percent in 2003.
2Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs were excluded from the primary data source, The
Banker magazine, until they were transformed from publicly traded investment banks
(emerging from partnerships in 1986 and 1999 respectively) to bank holding company
status in 2008.   The solid line in Figure 3 includes Goldman and Morgan Stanley only
6
for 2008-2010, overestimating the increase in the largest institutions' combined asset
share.  The dotted line excludes the two for 2008 through 2010, replacing them with the
next-ranked banks, causing a temporary indicated concentration decline for the crisis
years 2008 and 2009.  Had Goldman and Morgan Stanley been included in all years, the
trend line to the left of 2008 would have been elevated and its rate of growth would
probably have been increased.
7
Further perspective is provided by Figure 4, which arrays the ten banks included
in the more generous asset share tabulation plus two replacements in descending order
of 2010 assets.  The distribution, called "skew" by economists, is typical of the firm size
distributions observed in most modern industries.  A few firms tower over the rest.  
Difficult sample selection questions also had to be resolved in choosing the
denominator for the Figure 3 share calculations, i.e., the assets of bank-like institutions. 
The time series used, derived from Federal Reserve Board flow of funds accounts,
includes commercial banking, savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks,
credit  unions,  and  money  market  funds.    One  could  argue  over  the  inclusion  or
exclusion of other institutions providing financial services.  To put the argument in
perspective, Table 1 lists all the private sector financial components covered by the
Federal  Reserve  board  accounts.    Altogether,  the  assets  of  bank-like  institutions
included in the denominator universe for Figure 3 amount to roughly 41 percent of the
assets of both included and excluded financial institution counterparts.
Profit Shares and Their Implications
The rising trend in the concentration of banking institution assets is provokingly
similar to another rising trend:  in the share of total U.S. corporate profits attributable
to financial institutions (including insurance companies), presumably driven mainly by
the performance of banking corporations.  Figure 4 arrays the relevant statistics from
1960 through part of 2011.   In the numerator of the share calculation are the reported
8
pre-tax profits of all private financial corporations (excluding those of Federal Reserve
banks), but including companies operating in most of the fields spanned by Table 1. 
The  denominator  is  the  equivalent  profit  sum  for  all  U.S.  domestic  corporations,
including  profits  realized  by  the  Federal  Reserve  banks.    After  fluctuating  fairly
narrowly between 7 and 18 percent, the financial corporation share began rising,
     6.  The principal reason was to gain entitlement to FDIC
assistance.
     7.  Ally Bank, derived from the government-financed breakup of
General Motors in December 2008, had assets barely sufficient for
sample inclusion in the final years.  
     8.  The source is Economic Report of the President, various
years.  For the most recent years, the source table number in the
2012 report is B-91.
3reaching a peak of 40 to 42 percent in 2002 and 2003.   The crisis of 2008 induced a
9
steep decline to 10 percent, but recovery to the 30 percent level was rapid.  By way of
comparison, the finance and insurance sectors, nearly equivalently defined, originated
7.6 percent of gross domestic product in 2000 and 8.4 percent in 2010.   Thus, there is
10
a vast disproportion between the value added share of financial corporations in the
economy and their equivalent share of profits.
11
If anything, this picture understates the profitability of financial institutions.  Wall
Street financial institutions are said to apply a rule of thumb.  As the end of a fiscal year
approaches,  they  estimate  their  gross  profits  before  taxes and  reallocate  part  as
bonuses to achieve total staff compensation amounting to 50 percent of the profit pool.  
12
Consider the implications. Assume that the after-bonus (i.e., reported) profits of all
financial corporations are 100.  Of these, we assume 30 percent to reside in banks
conforming to the 50 percent rule.  If the pay of those 30 percent were not topped up
from profits, the banks' profits would have been higher -- in an extreme and limiting
case, 1/.5 = 2 times higher, or 60, rather than 30.  Thus, the total financial profit pool
would have been elevated to 100 + 30 = 130.  To calculate financial institutions' share
of all profits, the total for all corporations must also be increased by 30, so if the post-
topup share of financial corporations' profits were 40 percent, as in 2003, implying total
corporate (financial and nonfinancial) profits of 100/.40 = 250, the non-bonus share of
financial corporations would be 130/250 = 52 percent, not 40 percent.
     9.  The dotted line shows the profit share reported by an
earlier Economic Report of the President and then amended in the
2012 report.
     10.  Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, Table
670.  
     11.  Curiously, returns on bank equity in the same period,
omitting the 2008 crisis, ranged between 8 and 15 percent -- far
from  exorbitant  levels.    See  "The  Not-for-Profit  Sector,"  The
Economist, May 5, 2012, p. 69, verified using medians from annual
Fortune 500 industry tabulations.  Apparently, finance became more
equity-intensive as profits ballooned.  The explanation does not
appear to lie in greatly increased economy-wide capital intensity. 
Bank  credit  outstanding,  including  both  business  and  consumer
finance, was approximately 46 percent of gross domestic product in
1985 and 58 percent in 2004.  Between 1960 and 2010, there was no
significant time trend in nonresidential capital investment as a
percentage of GDP.  The rationale probably involves more complex
approaches to financing.  One indicator is that returns on equity
in the middle 1980s were actually higher on average than in 2010-11
and only a percentage point lower than in 2003-2005, even though
the finance sector profit share was much lower in the 1980s.
     12.  See e.g. "The Big Financial Pay Pie," Fortune, December
7, 2009, p. 24; and "Parsimony, for Goldman," New York Times, July
21, 2010, p. B2.
4Implicit in this calculation is the assumption that all compensation is in the form
of bonuses that are an  economic rent with little or no direct impact on the quantity of
relevant  financial  services  supplied.     This  is  of  course  not  true;  substantial
13
compensation is required to induce the services of the banks' staffs.  But that it borders
on an important truth is suggested by the results of research by Claudia Goldin and
Lawrence Katz.   They tapped the comprehensive alumni records of Harvard College
14
and sent survey questionnaires to the members of three undergraduate cohorts -- those
graduating  in 1980,  1990,  and 2000.    A  substantial response  of 6,554  alumni was
received.  The responses included data on graduate degrees received after Harvard
College,  earnings  in  the  year  2005,  occupation,  and  time  intervals  spent  without
employment.  These were linked inter alia to data on SAT scores and college grade
point averages, controlling within an already select sample for demonstrated academic
ability.  When all of the control variables were included in multiple regressions, the
authors found for example that alumni with law or medical degrees achieved earnings
premia relative to their peers of 46 percent.   Holding other variables equal, those who
15
were employed in the financial industries received earnings premia of 195 percent, or
nearly three times those of their peers.  Since many controls for ability, even if not work
effort, were included in the analysis, these premia must almost surely be viewed as an
approximation to economic rents.  To the extent that two-thirds of financial employees'
earnings were more in the nature of rents, the calculation in the last two sentences of the
previous paragraph, the rent component would have been on the order of 20 points,
total pay in financial entities would be 120 rather than 130, total universe pay 240 rather
than 250, and the true profit share of financial corporations 48 percent.
It is not quite true, however, that the extraordinarily generous compensation paid
by many financial institutions is rent in the strict economic sense of the word, with no
significant resource allocation implications.  High Wall Street compensation does affect
resource allocation.  It biases the career choices of the best students toward finance and
away from other productive careers they might otherwise have chosen.  Goldin and Katz
report that the fraction of Harvard College graduates working in finance rose from 5
percent for the first cohort to 15 percent for the latest cohort.  The finance percentage
rose to 28 percent in 2008 and then declined (with fewer job openings) to 17 percent
in 2011.   Colleagues from the Physics Department at Harvard have bemoaned the
16
     13.  See The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Macmillan:
1987), vol. 4, p. 141.
     14.  Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, "Transitions:  Career
and Family Life Cycles of the Educational Elite," American Economic
Review, May 2008, pp. 363-369.  
     15.  Those with Ph.D.s earned 20 percent less on average!
     16.  See e.g. Benjamin Friedman, "Is Our Financial System
Serving Us Well?" Daedalus, Fall 2010, p. 15, who asks "whether in
the aggregate the direction of such a large fraction of our most
skilled, best-educated, and most highly motivated young citizens to
the financial sector constitutes the best used of what is surely
one of our nation's most valuable resources."  Thhe data for 2008
and 2011 came from the web site of the Harvard University Office of
5tendency for many students in their field to become Wall Street "quants" rather than
choosing to work in science and technology -- specialties where, it is said, the United
States has experienced significant new domestic talent shortfalls, compensated to an
unknown extent by the inflow of science and engineering graduates and especially
students from abroad.   If it falls behind in achieving innovative real sector advances
17
by stressing financial sector talent and the innovations that presumably follow from it,
the United States could suffer significantly.  But on this, as on many other aspects of
financial innovation, reasonable observers may disagree.
Implications of Size and Concentration
Two questions remain:  (1)  what are the consequences of enhanced bank size
and concentration for various aspects of industry performance; and (2)  what policy
measures are implied from these consequences?  We begin with the former.
One  obvious  implication  has  been  stated  already:    As  banking  institutions
become larger and engage with a wider range of other financial entities, systemic risk --
i.e., the probability that adverse economic events will set off a domino chain of reactions
with dire consequences for the entire economy -- rises at least apace.  Individual
institutions become "too big to fail," requiring financial help from national treasuries and
central banks inconsistent with the logic of free markets.  The furor that accompanied
the U.S. government's TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) in 2008 and 2009 hardly
needs  retelling.    I  happen  to  agree  that  temporary  relief  was  warranted  by  the
circumstances, but I concur too that it creates significant moral hazard dangers, leading
banks to be less cautious about the investments they commit and hence aggravating the
risk of future crises.  By reducing the risk of the largest institutions while leaving smaller
rivals unprotected, it also reduces differentially, perhaps significantly, the cost of
borrowing for too-big banks.   This cost advantage in turn could reinforce the tendency
18
toward concentration of banking assets in the largest enterprises.
A second implication comes from the power of money to influence governmental
processes, especially since the Citizens United decision of January 2010.   Even before
19
Citizens United, the finance lobby is said to have contributed $475 million to political
Career Services.
     17.  See William Zumeta and Joyce Raveling, "Attracting the
Best and Brightest," Issues in Science & Technology, Winter 2002-
03, pp. 36-40; Vivek Wadhwa, "A Reverse Brain Drain," Issues in
Science  &  Technology,  Spring  2009,  pp.  45-52;  and  Robert  D.
Atkinson,"Why the Current Education Reform Strategy Won't Work,"
Issues in Science & Technology, Spring 2012, pp. 29-36.
     18.  See the statistical analysis by James Kwak, "Who Is Too
Big To Fail?," paper prepared for a Fordham University conference 
in  March  2010,  who  finds  a  "too  big"  advantage  for  banks  with
assets exceeding $100  billion of roughly 50 basis points after
controlling for other measures of risk.
     19.  Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct.
876 (January 2010).
6candidates in 2008 -- more than twice the level of contributions from the second-largest
lobby, the health care industry.   This concentration of the power to support legislators
20
financially and presumably to influence their decisions is wholly at odds with American
traditions, seen inter alia in James Madison's Federalist papers, especially Number 10;
the history of Andrew Jackson's opposition to the first National Bank;  and the revolt
21
against politically powerful Big Business underlying the antitrust movement of the late
19th and early 20th centuries.  
22
Third, and central to the theme of the present conference, is the possibility that
the  increasing  prominence  of  the  largest  financial institutions  is  accompanied  by
economic power exercised to achieve elevated prices and profits.  This is a central
theme of the subfield of economics known as "industrial organization," one of my
principal specialties.  Like almost every other domain in economics, it is not without
controversy, both theoretical and empirical.  That something is askance is suggested
by the disproportionate profit share and employee rents realized by financial industries
during the past two decades.  One is tempted to embrace the syllogism:  Rising
concentration, rising profitability, therefore evidence of monopoly power.
This would be too simple, however.  I see no way of denying the evidence of
supra-normal profitability in Figure 4.  The problem lies in  Figure  3.  The rising
concentration shown there is best called "aggregate concentration," that is, the share
of assets or some other variable controlled in an economic sector by some small
number -- e.g., ten -- of leading enterprises.  But as the distinguished M.I.T. economist
Morris Adelman warned long ago, "Absolute size is absolutely irrelevant."   Rather,
23
industrial organization theory and statistical evidence teach that market concentration --
that is, a high market share collectively held by the largest few sellers in a well-defined
and  meaningful  economic  market  --  is  conducive  to  either  monopoly  pricing  or
cooperative oligopoly pricing, yielding elevated prices and supra-normal profits (i.e.,
economic rents).  The universe whose share the ten leading banking firms Figure 3
traces comprises all kinds of banking activity in the United States, ranging from taking
consumer checking and time deposits to granting diverse loans at interest to helping
          20.    Kevin  Drum,  "Capital  City,"  Mother  Jones,
January/February 2010, p. 42.
     21.  Earl Kintner and Hugh C. Hansen quote President Jackson's
statement that "It is easy to conceive that great evils to our
country and its institutions might flow from such a concentration
of power in the hands of a few men."  "A Review of the Law of Bank
Mergers," Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review, vol.
14 (December 1972) at p. 214.  Jackson's visage adorns U.S. 20-
dollar bills.
     22.  For my own analyses, see "Efficiency, Fairness, and the
Early  Contributions  of  Economists  to  the  Antitrust  Debate,"  29
Washburn Law Journal 243-255 (1990); and Part I of Competition
Policy, Domestic and International (Edward Elgar: 2000).
          23.    Testimony  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Antitrust  and
Monopoly, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, hearings, Economic
Concentration (Part I: 1964).
7companies float securities and much else.  The ten included banking institutions are all
U.S.-based private corporations, excluding foreign-owned banks, partnerships (of
which only a few significant examples survive), and public enterprises such as Fannie
Mae.  The markets in which they compete are implicitly nationwide.  Thus, Figure 3
arguably does not deal with meaningfully defined economic markets, and it would be
wrong to apply to them the standard structure - conduct - performance paradigm of
industrial organization theory.
There is another obvious problem.  Even assuming that the sectors tabulated in
Table 1 together comprise a meaningful market, the share of the top ten enterprises
reaches at most 53 percent -- well short of the tight oligopoly threshold.  And most
industrial organization scholars believe that markets must be more highly concentrated
-- e.g., with the four leading participants commanding 40 to 60 percent of sales or assets
-- to comprise an oligopoly capable of yielding cooperative pricing and hence elevated
profits.
Yet the abnormally high profits and rents are there for all to see.  There must be
an economic cause, not yet identified.  Indeed, there are, we shall see, more than one
plausible causes.  What remains is to nail them down.   
A beginning insight is that much commercial banking -- notably, the issuance of
loans to all but large business firms and the provision of checking account services --
is in the present state of technology (ignoring potential internet-based developments
such as "crowd-funding") preponderantly local.   This is recognized inter alia by the
24
Federal  Reserve  Board  and  the  antitrust  agencies,  and  as  a  result,  they  have
cooperatively compiled statistics on the concentration of bank deposits in localized
markets -- metropolitan statistical areas for urban banking, and counties for rural
banking -- throughout the United States.  The average three-firm concentration ratio in
2006 was 61.2 percent for urban areas and 85.5 percent for rural counties.   On
25
average,  one  could  generalize  that  the  typical  urban  banking  market  is  a  loose
oligopoly and the average rural banking market a fairly tight oligopoly.  Given such
market structures, cooperative pricing of time deposit interest rates and loan rates falls
into the realm of possibility.  There is of course considerable variation around these
mean concentration values, facilitating statistical analysis of how differences affect
pricing.  The results are complex and not always uniform.  But the central thrust is that
depositors receive lower interest rates, and borrowers pay higher loan rates in the most
concentrated local markets, other variables held equal.   Thus, high-side values of local
26
          24.    For  a  skeptical  view,  see  "Will  Crowdfunding  Beget
Crowdfrauding?" Bloomberg Businessweek, May 6, 2012, p. 51.  On the
early success of one crowdfunding internet site, see "Start-Ups
Look to the Crowd," New York Times, April 30, 2012, p. B1.
     25.  Pilloff, supra note 3 at p. 277.
     26.  See e.g. Pilloff, supra note 3; Allen Berger and Timothy
Hannan, "The Price-Concentration Relationship in Banking," Review
of Economics and Statistics (vol. 71, May 1989), pp. 291-299);
Robin Prager and Timothy Hannan, "Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers
Generate  Significant  Price  Effects?,"    Journal  of  Industrial
Economics, vol. 46 (December 1998), pp. 433-451); Timothy Hannan,
8market concentration may help explain pockets of superior profitability in banking.
This  is  well  recognized  and  accepted  by  the  relevant  federal  and  state
authorities, and as a result, there have been active efforts to restrain the growth of local
market  concentration  in  banking  through  antitrust  actions  blocking  the  most
concentration-increasing mergers.  On this, more subsequently.  As a probable result,
average local market three-firm concentration ratios have actually tended to decline by
5 to 6 percentage points  between  1990  and  2006 even while  aggregate banking
concentration was rising briskly.
27
It is probable, however, that we have explained only a part, and perhaps a small
part, of the profit puzzle.  Larger borrowers are apt to be less confined to local markets
and more apt to do business with the largest banking institutions.  And banking involves
much more than simply taking in deposits and lending out depositors' money.  Here,
alas, we confront a vast statistical void.  The relevant statistics, requiring inter alia
rigorous market definition as well as the ability to enforce survey compliance, simply
do not exist, at least for someone outside the system like the author.
The only estimates known to me on concentration in more specialized banking
markets have been published by the Clearing House Association, a consortium owned
by 17 large U.S. and foreign banks.  The results are summarized in Table 2.  Both
numerator and denominator appear to exclude the activities of foreign banks operating
in the United States.  Many of the definitions, e.g., on exactly how activity has been
measured,  are  unclear.    What  is  clear,  however,  is  that  the  largest  banks  --
preponderantly,  those  covered  by  Figure  4  --  have  relatively  minor  combined
nationwide positions in such activities as retail (i.e., consumer-oriented) deposit holding
and small business loans.  On the other hand, the markets for services such as floating
debt and equity issues,  organizing loan syndicates, operating credit card networks,
28
handling (often bundling) mortgage-based securities, and merger and acquisition
support are highly concentrated -- enough so that one would expect oligopolistic
pricing behavior to emerge.
The  Clearing  House  market  share  estimates  are  sparsely  explained  and
documented,  and  one  might  from  other  evidence  question  their  accuracy.    Most
notably, the New York Times publishes quarterly estimates of deal value and market
"The  Functional  Relationship  Between  Prices  and  Market
Concentration,  in  David  Audretsch  and  John  J.  Siegfried,  eds.,
Empirical Studies in Industrial Organization (Kluwer: 1992), pp.
35-59; Timothy Hannan, "Bank Commercial Loan Markets and the Role
of Market Structure," Journal of Banking and Finance (vol. 15,
1991), pp. 133-149; and Isil Erel, "The Effect of Bank Mergers on
Loan Prices: Evidence from the U.S.," working paper, Ohio State
University (August 2006).
     27.  Pilloff, supra note 3 at p. 277.
     28.  A study at Oxford University found "no good reason" why
fees  charged for initial public offerings in the United States
remain at 7 percent when they approximate 4 percent in Europe. 
"High-speed Slide," The Economist, November 14, 2009, p. 86.
9shares of the leading financial institutions, domestic and foreign, in providing advice
(and presumably helping issue new securities if needed) when nonfinancial companies
execute mergers and acquisitions.    If one merely adds up the stated deal volume
29
shares for the top five financial advisers, one finds a sum of 93.5 percent -- not far from
the 100 percent share suggested in the Clearing House report for the top six banks.  But
from the New York Times listing, one sees additional shares for nine more banks, with
the shares for all 15 listed banks totalling 179 percent.  The explanation is provided by
The Times:  "Multiple firms are usually involved in each transaction."  If one divides the
share of the five leaders by the sum of all listed banks' shares, one arrives at an estimate
for the five leaders of 52 percent -- a huge disparity from the Clearing House report
estimate.  
Nevertheless, two additional inferences are warranted.  First, the business of
advising on the financial aspects of mergers is oligopolistic, even if only loosely so.  But
second,  diverse  banks  are  cooperating  to  provide  the  desired  advice;  they  are
presumably working together rather than at arms length.  And when they cooperate in
an important and profitable activity such as merger advice, one might expect them to
develop  cooperative  attitudes  toward  the  pricing  of their  services  --  an  essential
ingredient for solving the oligopoly pricing problem in a manner that yields supra-
normal profits.   In this may lie at least part of the secret of the extraordinary profits and
30
rents realized by financial industry actors.
Another facet of the Clearing House estimates demands comment.  The report is
unclear on what is meant by the "trading of ordinary securities," for which a market
share of 100 percent is given for the top six banks.  It may refer to so-called "dark pool"
trading, said to have risen to 14 percent of all U.S. stock trades.  The advantage banks
have as the focus of such trading is slightly higher computer-based speed, lending itself
to  high-frequency  trading,  but  with  palpably  less  transparency  than  standard
exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange and NAFTA.   Needless to say,
31
ordinary investors are unable to participate in such markets, which among other things
are essentially unregulated.  Alternatively, it might cover trading securities for the
bank's  own  account  (i.e.,  "proprietary  trading"),  which  has  been  said  by  many
observers to be a major and sometimes the preponderant contributor to leading banks'
profits (to be limited in yet-unknown ways by the application of Dodd-Frank-Volcker
law rules).   But here we find a variant on the cooperation theme.  To make consistent
32
     29.   The estimates for 2011 appear under "On Wall Street,
Deal Makers Have a Renewed Optimism for the New Year," New York
Times, January 3, 2012.
          30.  See  F.  M.  Scherer  and  David  Ross,  Industrial  Market
Structure  and  Economic  Performance  (3rd  ed.,  Houghton-Mifflin:
1990), especially Chapter 6.  In game theory, strategies that yield
maximum profits are called cooperative strategies.
          31.    See  "Where  Has  All  the  Trading  Gone?"  Bloomberg
Businessweek, May 14, 2012, pp. 49-59.  Credit Suisse and Goldman
Sachs are said to be the largest dark pool providers.
     32.  See e.g. John Cassidy, "What Good Is Wall Street?" The
New Yorker, November 29, 2010, p. 55; "As Goldman Thrives, Some Say
10profits in securities trading, having superior information is crucial.  Given the wide
range of financing activities in which they participate and the large staffs they employ
among  other  things  to keep  minute-by-minute  track of what is happening on the
industrial scene, the largest banks arguably do have superior information.  Part of their
trading  advantage  may  come  innocently  from  devoting  more  resources  to  the
information compilation problem.  As a Lazard Freres official observed about her work
for various foreign clients, "This department has become very important for Lazard.... 
It  gives  us  unparalleled  insight  into  the  European  debt  crisis,  and  all  the  other
departments benefit."    Nevertheless, despite the purported existence of "Chinese
33
walls" and similar internal information-transmission rules, the major banks presumably
derive a trading advantage from internal knowledge of forthcoming events that will
drive stock market prices.  This is presumably illegal, but one can hardly deny that it
exists.   On this, which may be of key importance, our ignorance is vast.
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The market share - oligopoly insights provided by the Clearing House study have
been supplemented by information extracted unsystematically from the trade literature
by the author.  As noted earlier, Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch dominate the
business of rating securities.   Five U.S. banking firms are said to write 97 percent of
35
credit default swaps.   Nine Wall Street firms enjoyed exclusive membership in a
36
committee  overseeing  trading  in  derivatives.       Roughly  consistent  with  the
37
Clearinghouse estimate, the four largest U.S. banks are reported to issue two-thirds of
all credit cards.     Four institutions account for roughly two-thirds  of mutual fund
38
holdings.   Four firms originated nearly half of corporate debt issues in the United
39
an Ethos Fades," New York Times, December 16, 2009, p. A1; and
"Bombmakers Bombarded," The Economist, July 17, 2010, p. 78.
     33.  "The Greeks' Financial Goddess," Bloomberg Businessweek,
April 29, 2012, p. 44.  See also "Two Ways for Banks To Win," New
York Times, December 20, 2011, Business Day section.
     34.  See e.g. "U.S. Inquiry of Insiders at Goldman Broadens,"
New York Times, April 27, 2012, p. B1; "Two Ways for Banks To Win,"
New York Times, December 20, 2011, p. 4 of business section; and
"After Quiet Years, British Regulator Gets Tough on Abuses," New
York Times, April 27, 2012, p. B5.
     35.  There is a fourth U.S. fringe firm, Egan-Jones.  In 2012,
the German government was seeking to establish a fourth competitor.
          36.    "Projecting  the  Impacts  of  Default  on  U.S.  Banks,"
Bloomberg Businessweek, November 13, 2011, p. 44.
     37.  "A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Derivatives Trading,"
New York Times, Dec. 12, 2010, p. 1.  
     38.  "The End of Wall Street," Bloomberg Businessweek, April
19, 2010, p. 42.
          39.    "A  Look  at  JPMorgan  Chase's  Lineup,"  Bloomberg
Businessweek, March 25, 2012, p. 60.
11States.   After a contemplated merger, the largest agent would handle 70 percent of
40
American corporate stock transfers.    Clearly, pockets of tight oligopoly exist in the
41
parts of the banking  industry served preponderantly by the largest entities.  But
systematic information on specialized financial services market structures is at best
sparse.  We remain mired in an information void like the one that existed at the start of
the 20th Century.  As Theodore Roosevelt, who took steps to fill the void, observed in
his first message as President to the U.S. Congress, "The first requisite [for combatting
the trust problem] is knowledge, full and complete -- knowledge which may be made
public to the world."
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Banking Mergers and Antitrust
To be sure, the problem of concentration in banking markets has not been
ignored in U.S. policy.  Laws have been passed to control mergers at both the economy-
wide level -- notably, the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 -- and specifically in the banking
industry.   There were ambiguities in Celler-Kefauver that made it unclear whether
43
bank mergers would be included under the jurisdiction of the federal antitrust agencies. 
Both clarification and confusion emerged with the Bank Merger Act of 1960  and the
44
Bank Merger Act of 1966.   Definitive interpretations evolved only with decisions by the
45
Supreme Court, to which I turn momentarily.  Adding confusion were changing views
over the legality of combining commercial banking -- e.g., taking deposits and making
loans to individuals and companies -- with investment banking, and the appropriateness
of branching by banks both within states (governed largely by state laws) and across
state borders.  The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 created strong prohibitions against
combining under a single institutional roof both commercial banking and investment
banking.  Its reach was limited by Bank Holding Company Act amendments in 1970,
46
which gave the Federal Reserve Board authority to approve the merging of functions "so
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
          40.    "Foreign  Banks  See  Opportunity  in  U.S.  Financial
Turmoil," New York Times, June 17, 2009, p. B8.  Included in the
tally were U.S. corporate debt issues managed by foreign banks.
     41.  E-mail broadcast from the American Antitrust Institute,
August 30, 2011.  
          42.    Addresses  and  Presidential  Messages  of  Theodore
Roosevelt, 1902-1904, at pp. 294-296.
     43. For excellent reviews of bank merger legislation and court
interpretations thereof, see Kintner and Hansen, supra note 21; and
Terry  Calvani  and  W.  Todd  Miller,  "Antitrust  Analysis  of  Bank
Mergers:  Recent  Developments,"  Review  of  Banking  &  Financial
Services, vol. 13 (July 1993).
     44.  74 Stat. 129 (1960).
     45.  12 U.S.C. 1828(c) (1976 edition).
     46. 12 U.S.C. 1841-49 (1970) (1976 edition).
12thereto."    In 1999, Glass-Steagall was totally repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
47
Act.   Meanwhile, prohibitions on interstate banking were relaxed by the Riegle-Neal
48
Interstate Banking and Efficiency Act of 1994,  which, according to Professor Carl
49
Felsenfeld, changed the prevailing legal view from "the best banks are small banks" to
"big banks are all right, too."   As inspection of Figure 1 shows, merger activity rose to
50
peak levels shortly thereafter.  
Supreme Court Interpretations
There were sufficiently many ambiguities and outright conflicts in early bank
merger legislation that clear standards could emerge only through Supreme Court
interpretations.  Breaking a history of inactivity on the banking front,  the Department
51
of Justice in 1961 brought five complaints against banking mergers, the first and most
important  of  which  was  in  the  Philadelphia  Bank  case.     The  Comptroller  of  the
52
Currency had approved the merger of Philadelphia National Bank with Girard Trust,
arguing that a larger bank (with some 36 percent of Philadelphia metropolitan area
bank deposits) would by virtue of its size be better able to compete with New York
banks in providing capital to sizeable Philadelphia enterprises.  The Supreme Court
rejected  this  view,  articulating  several  key  precedents.    First,  it  dispelled  the
jurisdictional confusion in existing statutes, making it clear that DoJ could in fact act to
enjoin banking mergers under the Celler-Kefauver Act.  Second, it defined the relevant
product market as "the cluster of products (various kinds of credit) and services (such
as  checking  accounts  and  trust  administration)  denoted  by  the  term  'commercial
banking.'"    Third,  observing  that  for  all  but  large  depositors  and  borrowers,
convenience and high transportation costs led most bank customers to confer their
patronage on local community banks, it defined the relevant geographic market as a
four-county area enveloping Philadelphia.  It stressed too that "small businessmen
especially are ... confined to their locality for the satisfaction of their credit needs." 
Fourth, it rejected defense testimony that competition among banks was and would
continue to be vigorous.  Fifth, it emphasized the combined banks' market share of
roughly 36 percent and observed that after merger the four largest Philadelphia area
banks would command 58 percent of deposits and net loans.  Finally, it rejected the
argument that merger  would  make the two banks more  effective  as  competitors,
observing that they had alternative ways to expand their local impact and stimulate
     47.  12 U.S.C. 1843(c)(8) (1976 edition).
     48.  113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
     49.  108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
     50.  Carl Felsenfeld, "The Antitrust Aspects of Bank Mergers,"
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, vol. 12 (2008) at p.
507.
     51.  The first important exception, no doubt bolstering the
Justice Department's confidence, was U.S. v. Firstamerica Corp.,
Civil.  No.  38139  (N.D.  Cal.  1959),  cert.  den.  at  361  U.S.  928
(1960).
     52.  U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
13economic development, concluding with the dictum that:
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[A] merger the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition"
is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits
and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.  A value choice of such magnitude is
beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and in any event has been
made for us already, by Congress when it enacted the amended Section 7. 
Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive economy.  It
therefore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant
alike, fully aware, we must assume, that some price might have to be paid.
One might object in hindsight that later, during the 1970s, rich new opportunities
for consumers to invest funds of $10,000 or more at interest began to open up with the
advent of bank certificates of deposit and money market funds.  The information needed
to identify such opportunities was available in major newspapers; and telephonic, mail,
or even wire media sufficed to open and close accounts and transmit funds.  But this
potential loophole was essentially closed by additional Supreme Court decisions over
the next seven years.   In particular, in its Phillipsburg decision, the Court focused on
54
the key role that banks play in providing loans to local small businesses:
55
[I]f anything, it is even more true in the small town than in the large city
that "if the businessman is denied credit because his banking alternatives have
been eliminated by mergers, the whole edifice of an entrepreneurial system is
threatened."
This view reflects a broader historical tradition in the United States seeing the yeoman
small businessman as particularly worthy of sustenance, not only under antitrust but also
under programs such as small business set-asides in defense procurement and special
loan programs for small businesses.  The specific logic for mergers may be undermined
by a proliferation of internet-based loan and equity provision services in the future, but
on this, the facts remain to be established.
56
Supreme Court interpretations following Philadelphia Bank also clarified what
burden of proof needed to be sustained by would-be merger partners in arguing that
the concentration-increasing effects of their merger were more than offset by greater
loan-issuing scale, risk-reducing diversification, or other merger benefits -- an issue to
which we return later.  In the immediate cases, the Supreme Court said in its Third
National Bank decision that to sustain such a defense, the parties needed to prove that
     53. Idem. at 371.
     54.  Specifically, U.S. v. First National City Bank of Houston
et  al.,  386  U.S.  361  (1967);  U.S.  v.  Third  National  Bank  in
Nashville et al., 390 U.S. 171 (1968); and U.S. v. Phillipsburg
National Bank and Trust Company et al., 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
     55.  399 U.S. 350, 358.
     56.  Cf. note 24 supra.  Money market funds invest inter alia
in commercial paper with short maturities, providing (along with
some S&L institutions) additional loan sources.
14they had made a reasonable effort to achieve the benefits they predicted from the
merger by feasible means short of merger.   This insight by the Supreme Court is an
57
application of a principle with long standing in the field of operations research: the "with
or without" rule.  One analyzes the effects of an action against the outcome without that
action, assuming that reasonable efforts to achieve the objective without the action has
been pursued.
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Enforcement Actions
Interpretations of bank merger law by the Supreme Court between 1963 and 1970
established such strong precedents that blocking many mergers became the moral
equivalent of kicking extra points in professional football:  the antitrusters nearly always
succeeded.    The  laws  made  it  clear  too  that  the  favorable  bias  toward  mergers
traditionally exercised by bank regulators -- e.g., the Comptroller of the Currency, the
FDIC, and the Federal Reserve Board -- could readily be overcome by antitrusters if a
merger  had  significant  concentration-increasing  effects.    Therefore,  the  various
agencies began working together to gather and analyze the data needed to reach
merger judgments.  Indeed, in March 1995, joint Bank Merger Screening Guidelines
were adopted by the Department of Justice, the Comptroller, and the Federal Reserve
to guide banks as to what documentation would be required and what processes they
could anticipate.  
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A novice to the bank merger field, as the author is, might be inclined to analyze
what happened by searching a source such as CCH Trade Cases to ascertain what
merger complaints were brought and how they came out.  This was done for the years
1985-2010 with results that were surprising, although they should not have been. In
those 26 years, for which 10,321 voluntary commercial bank mergers are recorded in
Figure 1, there were 22 years in which  no anti-merger cases (i.e., either judicial
     57.  Third National Bank, supra note 53, at 190.  See also
Phillipsburg, 399 U.S. 350, 372 (1970).
     58.  I found this approach especially pertinent in analyzing
the claimed benefits from the proposed merger of Lockheed Martin
with  Northrop  Grumman  in  1998.    Substantial  cost  savings  were
projected from closing nearly one hundred R&D centers.  But careful
analysis showed that in nearly every case, Lockheed Martin already
had duplicative laboratories in most of the relevant substantive
areas, suggesting that it could have achieved consolidation and
maintained R&D scope without merger.  The merger was abandoned,
given  opposition  from  both  the  Defense  Department  and  the
Department of Justice.
     59.  See "Bank Merger Competitive Review -- Introduction and
Overview (1995)," dated "current as of 9/2000)," downloaded from
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/6472.htm;  and  Constance
Robinson, "Bank Mergers and Antitrust," speech text, May 30, 1996,
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/1003.htm.
15decisions or consent settlements) were reported.   In the seven recorded bank merger
60
consent  decrees  (including  two  involving  complete  debit  card  or  ATM  network
combinations rather than bank branches),  a total of 46 countable units were required
61
to be divested.
The  explanation  for  this  seeming  absence  of  formal  litigation  is  that  the
precedents evolved through Supreme Court interpretations were so strong, and the
threat of deal-breaking delays through both an automatic 30-day stay and a temporary
injunction against the subject merger if litigation began, that would-be merger makers
regularly  brought  their  plans  before  the  regulatory  authorities  in  advance  and
negotiated  voluntary  settlements  without  requiring  the  federal  (or  state)  antitrust
authorities to file a formal complaint, thereby preventing the action from coming to the
notice of the CCH reporting system.  According to a Department of Justice economist
immersed in the merger screening process:
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The U.S. Department of Justice ... reviews roughly 600 bank mergers per
year, of which it 'challenges' roughly one, although these 'challenges' do not
entail the filing of complaints in district court.  In fact, the DoJ has not filed a
complaint against a bank merger since 1993.   Rather, approximately once per
63
year the DoJ issues a press release announcing that competitive concerns with
a bank merger have been resolved through the divestiture of branches along
with associated deposits and outstanding loans.
A tally for parts of the years 1996 through 1999 released jointly by the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission reveals that the "once per year" assertion
significantly underestimates the volume of informal merger challenges.   From the
64
     60.  Several cases were reported that involved banks, but on
charges other than making allegedly anticompetitive mergers.  Most
numerous were nine failures of would-be merger partners to file
Hart-Scott-Rodino  notifications.    Also  recorded  were  various
exclusive dealing cases, health insurance company acquisitions, and
an alleged conspiracy.
     61.  The two exceptions to a focus on local commercial banking
involved Visa U.S.A. and Master Card International, CCH Trade Cases
Para 69,016 (1990) (brought solely by state attorneys general); and
First Data Corp. and Concord EFS, CCH Trade Cases Para. 74,481
(2004) (brought jointly by DoJ and state attorneys general).
     62.  Gregory J. Werden, "Perceptions of the Future of Bank
Merger  Antitrust:  Local  Areas  Will  Remain  Relevant  Markets,"
Fordham Journal of Corporate& Financial Law, vol. 13 (2008), p.
582.
     63.  The outcome of that complaint is included in my CCH
sample.
     64.  Merger Challenges Data, Fiscal Years 1999-2003 (December
18,  2003),  www.justice.gov/atr/public/201898.htm.    Am  appendix
provides more detailed qualitative information on mergers treated
16broader tabulation of merger cases in all industries, one finds that actions were taken
in 19 bank merger cases over the span of three and one-third years.  In only one case
was a bank merger stopped completely.   All others ended with the divestiture of one
65
or more branches, totalling 524.
In sum, the available evidence reveals that the antitrust authorities have held a
strong bargaining position as a result of judicial precedents, and they have used their
power to negotiate the divestiture of selected branches posing threats to competition
from  merging  parents  that  in  most  cases  persisted  in  effecting  their  merger,
presumably retaining a much larger number of branches.  There appears to be little
published insight into how the bargaining process works.  It would be reasonable to
assume that would-be merger makers negotiate with the government and seek to divest
branches in a manner that sacrifices minimal competitive advantage. As an investment
banker representing would-be acquirers of the divested branches observed about a
major New England merger case, "The point was to find absolutely the worst operator
possible."     The  account goes  on to assert  that the branches were divested to a
66
"weakling" and that the merging companies "quickly won back old customers" from the
new acquirer. 
It is clear that most divestitures were of branches, and the market definitions on
which they rested were for narrow geographic areas.  One cannot avoid asking, given
the wave of massive mergers recorded in Figure 2, and given that many of the lines in
which the largest investment banks excelled were among the highly concentrated fields
covered  by  Table  2,  why  were  there  no  anti-merger  actions  against  those
concentrations?  Confronted with a record that appears bare of definitive explanation,
the most likely hypothesis is that the antitrust agencies drew their thunder from the local
market focus of Philadelphia Bank and subsequent Supreme Court decisions, which
provided at best a minimal fulcrum for challenging mergers in other financial product
markets.   Indeed, one might assert that the antitrusters were fixated on local market
67
consolidations and as a result beheld the mote while ignoring the beam.   Support for
68
this inference comes inter alia from the fact that the bank merger screening guidelines
and worksheets issued by the Department of Justice in 1995 focus almost exclusively on
local geographic markets.   That statistical data on the structure of more specialized
69
investment banking functions were almost totally lacking, so that enforcers may not
between  1996  and  1999.    A  separate  table  on  bank  merger  cases
reveals that between 1999 and 2003, 56 relevant banking markets
were analyzed.
     65.  First Bank of Grants/Grants State Bank (May 1997).  The
merger involved two small banks in Arizona.
     66.  Shawn Tully, "Can This Man Fix America's Biggest Bank?"
Fortune, July 25, 2011, p.  144.
     67.  The two debit card network cases identified in footnote
60 supra appear to be the main exceptions.
     68.  Matthew Chapter 7, verse 3.
     69.  See note 59 infra.
17have perceived the concentration-increasing tendency of major mergers, could have
contributed to their neglect.  Whatever the explanation, which cries out for further
illumination,  enforcers  appear  to  have  allowed  an  elephant  to  escape  into  the
countryside even while they were doing good work to curb loan and deposit provision
concentration increases in local markets.
Efficiencies Defenses
If one were to propose antitrust action against concentration-increasing mergers
in specialized investment banking fields, one must recognize that such mergers might
conceivably be defended on the argument that they are efficiency-increasing.  Here lies
another mysterious absence in the vast record of anti-merger enforcement.  The Bank
Merger Act of 1966 authorized prohibition of banking mergers whose effect might be
"substantially to lessen competition" unless the responsible enforcement agencies
found  "that  the  anticompetitive  effects  of  the  proposed  transaction  are  clearly
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting
the convenience and needs of the community to be served."   This might in more
70
modern jargon be construed as an efficiencies defense, arguably invalidating the
Supreme Court's Philadelphia Bank dictum proscribing mergers, "the benign and the
malignant alike."  The Supreme Court returned to the issue in its 1968 Third National
Bank decision, stating that for the enforcement authorities to sustain the "convenience
and needs" defense, they must be persuaded that non-merger means of securing
alleged public interest advantages had been either tried and failed or shown to have
been unlikely to succeed.   Whether such efforts were made and failed is unknown. 
71
What is clear is that large numbers of mergers were successfully challenged despite
the escape hatch.  In 1984, after issuing Merger Guidelines in 1982 rejecting the
possibility of efficiency defenses "except in extraordinary cases,"  the Department of
72
Justice reversed field and acknowledged that it would consider clear and convincing
evidence that a merger "may be reasonably necessary to achieve such efficiencies."  
73
Later revisions maintained the essence of the 1984 efficiencies defense option.  Absent
a formal judicial record, it is unclear whether efficiency defenses have been attempted
and taken seriously in bank merger negotiations since 1984.  My own experience in
what I believe was the first post-1984 nonbank merger defense argued in court was that
the Department of Justice attempted to restrict the scope of such defenses severely and
that the district court found what might be a precedent-setting decision too difficult and
hence waived comment, deciding the case on other grounds.   But again, our insight
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1400 (1991).  See also Scherer, Competition Policy, Domestic and
International (Edward Elgar: 2000), Chapter 18, reprinting my May
1987 affidavit in the case on the logic of efficiencies defenses.
18on what happened in bank merger negotiations is severely limited.
If antitrust action were to be taken against large banking mergers, one can
expect that efficiencies defenses will be advanced.  It is useful to ask, therefore, how the
question has been illuminated in the financial economics literature.
Numerous statistical studies have attempted to provide answers.  Some have
focused on net profitability, some on interest costs, and some on non-interest expense
ratios.  Much of the research has been done by Federal Reserve Board staff, who had
the  advantage  of  greater  data  access.    Reflecting  on  that  work,  Alan  Greenspan
observed in 2010 that research by Federal Reserve staff "has been unable to find
economies of scale beyond a modest-sized institution."   An early summary of Federal
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Reserve staff studies concluded that cost savings were realized mainly through bank
size increases up to deposit levels of approximately $500 million -- far below the scale
of the largest trillion-dollar financial institutions.   Citing a later staff study, former Fed
76
staff member Steven Pilloff reported that "the precise point at which scale economies
disappear" (or are overcome by diseconomies) appears to lie at asset levels around
$10-25 billion -- a small fraction of the trillion-dollar levels surpassed by four banks
covered by Figure 5.   Pilloff reported non-interest cost as a percent of an income
77
measure dropping from 62 percent for banks with assets between $0.5 and $ 1.0 billion
to 57 percent for banks with assets in the range of $1 billion to upwards of $10 billion. 
A still newer study by Stimpert and Laux using regression equations found non-interest
cost ratios falling (by undeterminable rates) at smaller sizes but rising at scales well
below the asset and deposit volumes achieved by the largest banks.   On the other
78
hand, their equations reveal continuing increases in banks' net income ratios out to the
largest size ranges -- a result that could reflect either scale economies or greater
pricing power for the largest banks.
My own research on manufacturing industries (not banking) several decades ago
found that the most persistent single source of scale economies was the ability of the
largest  firms  to  raise  new capital  at  lower  interest  rates,  presumably  because  of
enhanced risk diversification and lower transaction costs relative to flotation volume. 
However, the interest cost advantage was considered to be slight to moderate relative
to sales for most of the industries examined.   A sophisticated new bank study by James
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Press, 1975), pp. 284-289 and 335.
19Kwak reaches similar but more interesting conclusions.   Kwak focused on banks'
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average rate of interest paid out as a percentage of deposits in 2009.  Controlling in a
multiple regression for diverse measures of portfolio risk, his initial finding was that
interest costs fell by roughly 20 basis points (i.e., one fifth of a percent) with each
tenfold increase in asset size, e.g., from $10 billion to $100 billion.  This advantage was
reduced by about two basis points when he included an additional variable singling out
banks with assets exceeding $100 billion.  Being in that "too big to fail" category,
however, reduced interest costs by 50 basis points -- an advantage that did not appear
when a comparable analysis was made for pre-crisis year 2004.  In that earlier year, he
found an apparently persistent decrease in interest costs of nearly 16 basis points with
each tenfold increase in assets.  Interpreting his results for 2009 is made difficult by the
fact that the average interest cost for all banks, large and small, was only 1.97 percent
of assets.  This occurred when the Federal Reserve was lending trillions of dollars at
very low interest rates to both small and large banks.  Nevertheless, Kwak's results for
2004 appear to confirm the hypothesis that financing economies of scale persist for
banks out to the size of the very largest banks.
All of the scale economy studies reviewed thus far take a blunderbuss approach,
statistically estimating profitability or cost ratios for the aggregate of banks' activity. 
The only research known to me that focuses on narrower facets of banking activity was
undertaken by the Clearing House Association, which apparently obtained the needed
data from at most ten of the 17 large banks that comprise its owners.   Nonlinear
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regression equations were computed taking cost indices (in most cases, with many costs
excluded) as the dependent variable and as independent variable an index of bank
size, with the relevant transaction volume of a bank with $50 billion in assets used as the
base index value of zero.   The resulting best-fitting cost predictions are shown as solid
82
curved lines in Figure 6 for six of the seven product line activities studied -- online bill
paying, check processing, credit card processing, debit card processing, automated
clearing house transaction processing, and wire transfer proocessing.  In all cases the
83
cost curves slope downward, implying economies of scale persisting even out to the
size of the largest owner banks (presumably, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, and
Citigroup).    The  curves  flatten  out,  consistent  with  other  scale  studies,  implying
diminishing marginal benefits of size.  The dots surrounding the fitted curves are actual
cost index observations drawn from two to four years of data.  To disguise the actual
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     81.  Understanding the Economics of Large Banks (2011). The
report itself is available on the Association's web site.  I am
grateful to the association's chief economist, Sujit Chakravorti,
for providing a copy of the more detailed Appendix.
     82.  Little qualitative information on the sources of measured
scale economies is provided.  Compare Clifford Pratten, Economies
of Scale in Manufacturing Industry (Cambridge University Press:
1971);  and  F.  M.  Scherer,  Economies  of  Scale  at  the  Plant  and
Multi-Plant  Levels:  Detailed  Evidence  (deposited  in  several
research libraries: 1975).
          83.    No  curve  was  presented  for  securities  transfer
operations.
20data, however, the authors have added randomly varying dummy points.   For example,
in  the  online  bill  paying  figure,  30  dots  are  visible  even  though  only  20  actual
observations were obtained.  Assuming (debatably) that similar scale economies apply
for unmeasured product line costs and aggregating their results, the (unnamed) authors
conclude that if all U.S. banks with assets exceeding $50 billion were held to transaction
volumes associated with a bank reporting assets of $50 billion, total relevant costs
annually (calculated from the computed cost curves, not from actual individual data)
would be $25 billion to $45 billion higher.  For perspective, the authors observe that 26
banks  with assets in excess of $50 billion held assets totalling $12 trillion at the time the
report was prepared.
The figures reproduced from the Clearing House report in Figure 6 suggest a
critical question.  For all of the product lines studied, individual bank costs represented
by dots scatter, as one might expect in a regression analysis, around the fitted cost
curve.  But for all but the debit card curve, the reported points pose a puzzle.  There are
points, i.e., relative cost ratios, for relatively smaller banks (among the universe of very
large banks) with costs as low as those of the very largest banks.  To be sure, the fitted
curves slope downward because their left-hand extreme is pulled up by some very high
cost observations.  But if relatively small ($50 billion) banks can achieve costs as low as
those of the largest banks, why are others less successful?  Clearly, economies of scale
are not so compelling that they necessitate higher costs for smaller banks.  Somehow,
some  of  the  smaller  banks  circumvent  them  --  unless  the  lowest  right-hand  side
observations are all artificially generated disguise dummies.  An alternative hypothesis
might be that a dynamic process leads most, but not all, banks with low costs to achieve
very large size, leaving behind mostly high-cost banks but for unexplained reasons also
some highly efficient entities.  How this puzzle might be reconciled is not addressed in
the Clearing House study.  
The study concedes  that some of the estimated benefits might be achieved
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through means other than having individual banks reach very large scale, e.g., through
centralization of high-scale-economy services in organizations that provide the desired
services to all banks on a for-fee basis.  Mentioned as examples are credit and debit
card services, although clearing house functions and securities transfer processing
seem equally plausible candidates.  If economies of scale indeed continue out to the
largest product volumes -- a hallmark of natural monopoly -- vertical disintegration is
an appropriate solution to Ronald Coase's "what is the firm" puzzle.   Given strong
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economies of scale, the disintegrated  functions  would  have  substantial monopoly
power.    Arguagly,  therefore,  they  should  be  required  to  provide  services  to  all
legitimate users at regulated "fair" rates. 
Also estimated in the Clearing House study are benefits (e.g., in the value of
customer convenience and transaction time saved as well as scale economies) from the
wide scope of activities pursued and the greater geographic reach of large bank
branches, and from contributions large banks make to the spread of technological
     84.  P. 41 of the main report. 
     85.  Ronald Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica, vol.
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21innovations.    Here too, methodological questions can be raised,  but we advance to
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a conclusion.  
The Clearing House study mounts an important challenge to the conventional
wisdom that scale economies are fully exhausted at relatively modest bank sizes.  That
both the sources of evidence and the authors who analyzed it are kept anonymous
lessens the report's credibility.  So also does the fact that the organization producing it
may have had an axe to grind on behalf of its large-bank owners.  Greater transparency
and, as always, further research are needed if the report's findings are to be accorded
definitive weight.  And if scale and scope economies really are persistent out to very
high product volumes, alternative means of achieving them need to be explored.  In the
mean time, one must admit that if an efficiencies defense were permitted in challenges
to individual large-bank mergers, the possibility of credibly compelling pro-merger
evidence cannot be ruled out.  Difficult tradeoffs might be required.
Conclusion
The  enforcement  of  the  merger  antitrust  laws  appears  to  have  achieved
substantial success in limiting what otherwise could have been additional concentration
in local banking markets.  However, the record in preventing the growth of leading
commercial and investment banks to gigantic size -- among other things, size posing
real "too big to fail" risks -- reveives much lower grades.  Reversion to 1933 Glass-
Steagall standards -- abrogated fully in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and not
reinstated as part of the Dodd-Frank law -- deserves serious consideration.  Whether
the eggs have been so thoroughly scrambled that renewed separation of commercial
banking from investment banking functions would be infeasible is a question that
demands attention.  It could be addressed inter alia as part of the forward planning for
future crisis-induced "resolution" required by Dodd-Frank.  Or alternatively, a separate
study could be mounted -- most likely, by the excellent research staff of the Federal
     86. On ATMs, one of the technological innovations studied,
independent  research  supports  an  inference  that  diffusion  was
indeed more rapid among the larger banks.  See Timothy Hannan and
John McDowell, "The Determinants of Technology Adoption: The Case
of the Banking Firm," Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 15 (Autumn
1984), pp. 328-335; and Garth Saloner and Andrea Shepard, "Adoption
of Technologies with Network Effects: An Empirical Examination of
the  Adoption  of  Automated  Teller  Machines,"  RAND  Journal  of
Economics, vol. 26 (Autumn 1995), pp. 479-501.
     87.  For example, larger banks are said to have more extensive
branch or ATM networks, saving consumers time in reaching them. 
But even if this were true, many consumers would choose to do their
business as part of a multitask trip that carries them near the
relevant  banking  location  rather  than  incurring  the  cost  of  a
special trip.  Similarly, banks with international scope clearly
provide  some  convenience  to  U.S.  companies  with  multinational
operations.    But  one  might  expect  such  companies  to  establish
parallel relationships with banks at home in the overseas locations
-- banks that often have branches in the United States handling
inter alia exchanges of foreign and dollar currencies.  
22Reserve.
An even tougher alternative would be to address excessive merger-induced
concentration through the antitrust laws.  The first requisite would be to assemble
reliable data on concentration in economically meaningful narrow product lines within
the too-broad universe of commercial and investment banking.  Doing so would be a
return to the good work done by the Bureau of Corporations in the 1900s, providing an
essential factual and analytic foundation for the Standard Oil and American Tobacco
divestitures.    It  is  conceivable  that  unscrambling  concentrating-increasing  bank
mergers would be more difficult than breaking up those loosely integrated entities a
century  ago,   but  only  careful  reseach  can  illuminate  both  the  dangers  and  the
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possibilities.    Certainly,  plausible  efficiencies  defenses  would  have  to  be  taken
seriously.  Short of retroactive merger reversal, the least one can reasonably ask is that
a  broader  approach  be  taken  to  merger  review  in  the  future,  so  that  undue
concentrations are prevented in specialized investment banking product lines as well
as in localized commercial banking markets.
     88.  See e.g. Kenneth Elzinga, "The Antimerger Laws: Pyrrhic
Victories," Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 31 (Summer 1986), pp. 431-450.
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